This paper addresses the stabilization of quantized linear systems under Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks. Using a state transformation that satisfies a certain norm condition, we first propose an output encoding method that achieves the stabilization of systems with finite data rates only under an assumption on the duration of DoS attacks. Next we add a condition on the frequency of DoS attacks and develop an output encoding method with an arbitrary state transformation. Finally we illustrate the obtained results with numerical simulations.
method was developed in [19] for asymptotic stabilization with finite-date rates, and due to its simple structure, this method was extended to various systems, such as nonlinear systems [20] , [21] and switched systems [22] , [23] . However, relatively little work has been done on quantized control under DoS attacks.
In this paper, we propose output encoding methods for the stabilization of systems with finite data rates in the presence of DoS attacks. If the closed-loop system does not suffer from DoS attacks, then coders can decrease their quantization ranges at every time-step, by using the measurement information. This leads to small quantization errors, and hence the plant state asymptotically converges to the origin. However, under DoS attacks, the decoder at the controller side cannot receive the measurement. Due to this lack of information, the error of output estimation used for quantization becomes large. Therefore, the coders cannot decrease their quantization ranges under DoS, which makes it difficult to design encoding methods resilient to DoS attacks. To solve this issue, we decrease the quantization ranges in the absence of DoS attacks but increase the quantization ranges in the presence of DoS attacks so that the coders can capture the measurement in their quantization region. Moreover, to ensure the closed-loop stability under a wide class of DoS attacks, we only assume that the duration and frequency of DoS attacks are averagely bounded, as in [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] . We can regard the proposed encoding strategy as a natural extension of the zooming-in method developed in [24] , [25] to the case under DoS attacks.
We first design an output encoding method only under an assumption on the duration of DoS attacks, employing a state transformation that satisfies a certain norm condition. Next we place assumptions on the frequency as well as duration of DoS attacks and develop an encoding method with an arbitrary state transformation. If we know the frequency bound of DoS attacks, then we can exploit it to allow longer DoS durations by using the second encoding method. Both of the derived sufficient conditions on the DoS duration and frequency are characterized only by the growth and decay rates of the quantization ranges in the presence and absence of DoS attacks.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we introduce the plant, the controller, and the basic encoding and decoding method together with an assumption on the average duration of DoS attacks. In Section III, we provide the main result, i.e., a sufficient condition on the attack duration for closed-loop stability, which can be obtained under a suitable state transformation. In Section IV, we discuss an output encoding method with an arbitrary state transformation under assumptions on both of the duration and frequency of DoS attacks. A numerical example is presented in Section V. Due to space reasons, the proofs for the technical results are omitted. Notation: The set of non-negative integers is denoted by Z + . We denote by ⇢(P ) the spectral radius of P 2 C n⇥n . Let us denote by A ⇤ the complex conjugate transpose of
. . , |v n |}, and the corresponding induced norm of A 2 C m⇥n is given by kAk 1 := sup{|Av| 1 : v 2 C n , |v| 1 = 1}. A square matrix in C n⇥n is said to be Schur stable if all its eigenvalues lie in the unit disc.
II. PROBLEM STATEMENT
In this section, we introduce the closed-loop dynamics including a basic encoding and decoding scheme. We also place an assumption on the duration of DoS attacks.
A. Plant
Consider a linear time-invariant system:
where x k 2 R n , u k 2 R m , and y k 2 R p are the state, the input, and the output of the plant, respectively. As illustrated in Fig. 1 , the plant is connected with a controller through a communication network subject to DoS, which will be described soon.
We here assume that the system matrix A is not Schur stable. This is because if A is Schur stable, then the zero control input u k = 0 (k 2 Z + ) achieves the closed-loop stability for arbitrary DoS attacks, and hence the stabilization problem we consider is trivial. Throughout this paper, we place the following assumptions: 
B. Observer-based controller and DoS attack
For the case without DoS attacks, we construct the following observer-based controller:
wherex k 2 R n ,ŷ 2 R p , and q k 2 R p are the state estimate, the output estimate, and the quantized value generated from y k , respectively. We will provide the details of how to generate the quantized output q k in the next subsection. We set an initial state estimatex 0 to bex 0 = 0.
The controller ⌃ C in (2) updates the state estimatex k by using the transmitted data q k . However, when an attack occurs at time k, the controller cannot receive q k . As a result, we use an open-loop controller in the case with DoS attacks:
Let us denote by d (k) the number of time-steps when DoS attacks are launched on the interval [0, k], namely, when the dynamics of the controller is given by ⌃ a C on [0, k]. As in [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] , we assume that the duration of DoS attacks is averagely bounded:
We call ⌫ d the DoS duration bound. The DoS duration bound ⌫ d is an upper bound of the limit superior of the DoS duration per time-step.
Remark 2.4: The authors of [10] [11] [12] , [15] considered systems with disturbances and noise, and hence placed the following DoS duration condition instead of (4):
is the number of time-steps when DoS attacks are launched on the interval [k 1 , k 2 ]. Although our closed-loop system also has the quantization noise y k q k , the noise exponentially decreases to zero under a certain DoS duration condition (4). This is the reason why we use the weaker condition (4) instead of (5).
Remark 2.5: The condition (4) implies that at most ⇧ d + ⌫ d k packets are affected by DoS attacks on the interval [0, k].
Since the system matrix A is not Schur stable, we can regard the closed-loop system as a switched system with a stable mode (in the absence of attacks) and an unstable mode (in the presence of attacks). The operation time of its unstable mode is not larger than ⇧ d + ⌫ d k. We have a similar situation for sampled-data switched systems with the average-dwell time assumption:
where h > 0 is a sampling period, (kh) is the number of switches on the interval [0, kh], and 1/⌫ 0 is called the average-dwell time. To see the similarity, assume that mode mismatches between the plant and the controller due to intersample switching lead to the instability of the closedloop system. If a switch occurs at kh + ✏ (0 < ✏ < h), then the closed-loop system is unstable on the interval [kh+ ✏, (k + 1)h); otherwise, the system is stable. Therefore, the system behavior at sampling times is unstable in the switched case if ✏ > 0 is sufficiently small. Moreover, from (6) , the number of time-steps of such unstable behaviors on the interval [0, kh] does not exceed ⇧ 0 + ⌫ 0 kh. In this sense, the average-dwell time assumption (6) for sampleddata switched systems is similar to the condition (4) on the average duration of DoS attacks; see, e.g., [22] , [23] for the details of sampled-data switched systems with quantization. However, whereas the unstable behavior in the switched case varies in dependence upon switching times, that is, ✏ in the discussion above, the unstable behavior induced by DoS attacks is static. We can therefore obtain an encoding method for stabilization under DoS attacks in a much simpler way.
C. Basic encoding and decoding scheme
Define the error e k 2 R n of the state estimation by e k :=
x k x k . Using an invertible matrix R 2 C n⇥n , we also define the error e R,k 2 C n by e R,k :
The estimation error of the output is given by
If the error bound E R,k satisfies (7), then
We partition the hypercube
into N p equal boxes. An index in {1, . . . , N p } is assigned to each partitioned box by a certain one-to-one mapping for all k 2 Z + . The encoder sends to the decoder the index q k of the partitioned box containing y k . Then the decoder generates q k equal to the center of the box with the index q k . If y k lies on the boundary of several boxes, then we can choose any one of them. The quantization error |y k q k | 1 of this encoding method satisfies
The goal of this paper is to obtain a bound sequence {E R,k : k 2 Z + } that achieves (7) for every k 2 Z + and makes the closed-loop system locally stable. Sincex 0 = 0, it follows from Assumption 2.1 that
To this end, we extend the zooming-in method developed in [24] , [25] to the case under DoS attacks Remark 2.6: This encoding and decoding method requires that the encoder at the plant side also has an observer that is synchronized with the one in the controller side. For this reason, the decoder sends acknowledgments to the plant side at each time, which allows the encoder to detect the DoS attacks. This setting is similar to that of the previous study [12] on control without quantization under DoS attacks, but has been commonly employed in networked control under non-malicious packet losses; see, e.g., the survey [4] .
III. MAIN RESULT
In this section, we provide the main result on quantized control under DoS attacks. Before stating the main result, we provide a basic fact of the maximum norm.
Proposition 3.1: Assume that A 2 C n⇥n is Schur stable. Take a constant c 2 R and an invertible matrix R c 2 C n⇥n satisfying
where J c is the Jordan canonical form of cA. Then the matrix
Let an invertible matrix R 2 C n⇥n satisfy 
then the encoding method with the error bound {E R,k : k 2 Z + } constructed by the update rule (13) achieves the state convergence: In this case, since # in (14b) satisfies lim sup N !1 #  ", Theorem 3.2 shows that for every DoS duration bound ⌫ d 2
[0, 1), there exists a partition number N 2 N such that the state convergence (16) is satisfied, which is consistent with Theorem 2 of [12] .
IV. ENCODING METHOD UNDER DOS FREQUENCY ASSUMPTION
In Theorem 3.2, we obtained a sufficient condition on a DoS duration bound ⌫ d for stabilization, using the linear transformation e R,k = Re k with the norm condition (12) . On the other hand, the parameter R can be tuned for other purposes. For example, to allow longer DoS duration, we should choose the matrix R minimizing the growth rate # a = kRAR 1 k 1 of the error bound. However, it is generally difficult to find an invertible matrix R satisfying these norm conditions simultaneously. In this section, we therefore generalize the encoding method to the case where the matrix R does not satisfy the norm condition (12) , by placing an additional assumption on the frequency of DoS attacks.
Let us denote by f (k) the number of consecutive DoS attacks until time k, namely, how many times the controller switches from ⌃ c to ⌃ a C on [0, k].
Assumption 4.1 (Frequency of DoS attacks):
There exist ⇧ f 0 and ⌫ f 2 [0, 0.5] such that for every k 0, the DoS frequency f (k) satisfies
We call ⌫ f the DoS frequency bound. The DoS frequency bound ⌫ f is an upper bound of the limit superior of DoS occurrences per time-step. Highfrequency DoS attacks satisfy (17) with large values of ⌫ f .
Fix an invertible matrix R arbitrarily. Let M 0 1, M kLk 1 , and ⇢ 2 (0, 1) satisfy
Define constants ✓ a , ✓ 0 , ✓ > 0 by ✓ a := # a = kRAR 1 k 1 (19a) 
then the encoding method with the error bound {E R,k : k 2 Z + } constructed by the update rule (20) achieves the state convergence (16) .
Remark 4.3:
In the previous studies [10] [11] [12] , [15] , the assumption on the frequency of DoS attacks is used because, to achieve stability in the continuous-time domain, the frequency at which DoS are launched must be small compared with the sampling rate. Therefore, the assumption on the DoS frequency bound is not needed for the discrete-time case, as in [14] . However, the output encoding method in Theorem 4.2 increases the error bound, E R,k+1 = ✓ 0 E R,k , at the first time-step after DoS attacks occur. For this reason, we here employ this frequency assumption to obtain a less conservative sufficient condition.
Remark 4.4: It follows from Proposition 3.1 that for every ✏ > 0, we can obtain an invertible matrix R 2 C n⇥n satisfying
As seen in the numerical example of the next section, such a matrix R can often lead to the update rule (20) that allows longer DoS duration than the update rule (13) under sufficiently small DoS frequency. 
V. NUMERICAL EXAMPLE
A linearized model of an unstable batch reactor studied in [26] is given byẋ This model is widely used as a benchmark example, and we here discretize this plant with the sampling period h = 0.2. We set the partition number N of the output quantization to be N = 71. We use the feedback gain K that is the linear quadratic regulator whose state weighting matrix and input weighting matrix are the identity matrices I 4 and I 2 . We also set the observer gain L that is the gain of the steady-state Kalman filter whose covariances of the process noise and measurement noise are I 4 and 0.1 ⇥ I 2 .
The closed-loop system with the encoding method of Theorem 3.2 is locally stable under the DoS duration
where we construct the transformation matrix R so that kR(A LC)R 1 k 1 = ⇢(A LC). On the other hand, the encoding method of Theorem 4.2 achieves the closed-loop stability if the DoS duration and frequency bounds ⌫ d and
where R is chosen so that kRAR 1 k 1 = ⇢(A). (1, 0.10). DoS attacks are launched on the intervals that are colored in gray. Fig. 2a illustrates the trajectories of x 1 and x 1 , which oscillate after DoS attacks unlike the case without quantization. This oscillation is caused by a large error bound E R due to the DoS attack, as shown in Fig. 2b. However (22), and we see from Fig. 3b that DoS attacks make the error bound E R diverge. As the error bound E R increases, the upper bound of the quantization error y q becomes large. This error leads to the instability of the closed-loop system as shown in Fig. 3a , although the difference between the bound ⌫ d < 0.106 in (22) and ⌫ d = 0.11 used in Fig. 3 is small. We see that the sufficient condition (21b) is fairly tight in this example.
Finally, we compute a time response by using the encoding method of Theorem 4.2, and Fig. 3 illustrates it under DoS attacks satisfying the duration condition (4) with (⇧ d , ⌫ d ) =
(1, 0.13) and the frequency condition (17) with (⇧ f , ⌫ f ) = (1, 0.04). Note that if we set the DoS frequency bound ⌫ f to be ⌫ f = 0.04, then the DoS duration bound ⌫ d must satisfy ⌫ d < 0.148 to achieve (23) . The error bound E R rapidly increases during the period [35, 55] due to the large frequency of DoS attacks, but the closed-loop system is stable despite the longer DoS duration. This is because the encoding method in Theorem 4.2 has a small growth rate ✓ a = 1.489 in the presence of DoS attacks, compared with the growth rate # a = 2.901 of the encoding method in Theorem 3.2.
VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS
We studied the problem of quantized output feedback stabilization under DoS attacks. The proposed encoding methods decrease the quantization range in the absence of DoS attacks but increase the range for avoiding the saturation of the quantizer if DoS attacks occur. We obtained sufficient conditions on the DoS duration and frequency bounds for stabilization with finite data rates, which are characterized by the growth and decay rates of the quantization range in the presence and absence of DoS attacks. Future work involves addressing more general systems by incorporating disturbances, noise, and model uncertainty.
